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The disarmament process began when President Gbagbo officially launched the symbolic ceremony of destruction in Guiglo on 19 May. [fn] The agreement stipulates that the power of all high-level military, civilian and security posts must be transferred to the Presidential Council. The President of the Council and the deputies must unanimously agree on a new commander of the army and head of intelligence (the latter requires the approval of the House of Representatives) and on the appointment and dismissal of ambassadors (proposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs) by declaring a state of emergency, war and peace, and taking extraordinary measures (after approval by a National Defence and Security Council and approval by the Security Republic). It does not say how the head of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) should be chosen, but under Libyan law, it is the prerogative of a prime minister. The appointment of the highest positions of State authorities, such as the heads of the Central Bank, the Court of Auditors, the High National Electoral Commission and the Supreme Court, shall be decided by the High Republic in consultation with the High Council of State. Libyan political agreement. He also had the power to appoint a Temporal Security Committee (TSC) to implement the guarantees provided for in the agreement, including ensuring the security of the Council (and later the new government) in Tripoli and preparing a nationwide ceasefire and disarming militias. To be integrated into the state security forces, the armed forces should recognize unity government and lay down their arms. A „comprehensive and lasting ceasefire“ was also planned, which was to enter into force at the time of the signing of the agreement. [fn] Ibid.Article 38.Hide footnote A major flaw in the strategy of creating facts on the ground in recognizing a unity government was that it was difficult to see how the international goals – to fight Daesh and stem the flow of refugees through Libya – could be sustainable without better governance and a truly broad consensus on state institutions and the military.

Progress in the fight against Daesh in Sirte has failed to resolve Libya`s political and institutional cleavages, nor to convince factions and their regional supporters, with some supporters of the deal hoping that national unity could be achieved through an anti-IS coalition under the auspices of the Council. [fn] The lack of a safety rail was frustrating for many Western officials. An Italian diplomat accused UNSMIL of not being informed of the necessary knowledge of local dynamics to start a dialogue on security. Interview with the Crisis Group, Rome, September 2015. On the eve of the signing, a senior EU official admitted: „I recognise that it was a mistake not to work on the path to security from the start. If we can chart the right course for security, then the political path can succeed, but not the other way around. Interview with the Crisis Group, Brussels, 7. December 2015 Interviews with crisis groups, Western diplomats, UN officials, Tunis, Brussels, Washington, January-March 2016.Hide the footnote This complicates efforts to resolve a political conflict that triggered a split between rival parliaments, governments and military coalitions in July 2014 – one based in the capital Tripoli, the other in the east and both with the support of competing regional players.

Convinced of their legitimacy, everyone fights for the control of important institutions. With the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and the National Oil Company (NOC) under Tripoli`s control, tobruk`s internationally recognized parliament and its al-Bayda government are trying to build parallel institutions. The parties are also challenging the assets of the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA, the sovereign wealth fund) in international courts. In anticipation of a unity government, most regional actors and all other international actors with an interest in the established CBL, NOC and LIA remain engaged. They understand that these institutions together represent more than $130 billion and have high-level technocratic expertise that is crucial for state reconstruction. In retrospect, supporters inflated support for the deal under rival legislation to justify further measures. [fn] Supporters of the deal pointed to a list of 92 HoR members who they said supported the deal, but omitted that support was conditional on changes to the draft agreement. Interviews with crisis group, Western diplomats, UN officials, Tunis, December 2015; and advisor to the members of the Presidium Council, Tunis, January 2016. The misrepresentations have also fueled the debate about the subsequent failure to obtain formal confirmation from the HoR. Supporters of the Agreement have repeatedly claimed that the HoR president prevented a vote on February 25, 2016 because most members were in favor of the agreement, but this is uncertain: HoR members say pro-approval members inflated the list of supporters, including members who were not in Tobruk that day. Telephone interviews of the crisis group, members of the HoR, Libyan politicians, Tobruk, Cairo, Tripoli, March-April 2016.Hide the footnote The claim of majority support was factually dubious – many members supported an agreement in principle but differed considerably in detail – and politically misleading, as important opponents were outside the HoR and the GNC and had the military power to intimidate their supporters, including several armed groups in western Libya and significant forces associated with Haftar and the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army, mainly in the east.

[fn] For example, in April 2016, a Tripoli-based armed group that did not recognize the Council attacked the home of one of its members. In eastern Libya, there are frequent reports of security services linked to Haftar arbitrarily arresting pro-council political activists and social media commentators. Crisis group interviews, residents, Tripoli, April 2016; Benghazi, July 2016.Hide the footnote With the signing of a decree, President Laurent Gbagbo appointed Guillaume Soro prime minister on March 29.2 Soro took office on April 4, 2007.3 On April 7, 2007, Gbabgo signed another decree establishing a transitional government of 33 ministers. In the transitional government, the Forces nouvelles had seven ministers, while the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), the president`s party, had nine; The Rally of Republicans (RDR) had 5 ministers; The Democratic Party of the African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA) had 5 ministers; The Union for Democracy and Peace in ivory Coast (UDPCI) had 2 ministers; the Democratic and Civic Union (UDCY), the Ivorian Workers` Party (PIT) and the Movement of Future Forces (MFA) each had 1 minister; and there were 2 ministers representing civil society.4 However, the transitional government was dominated by the president`s party, which held the interior and defense ministries. Forces Nouvelles had the portfolios of justice, tourism and communications.5 The main responsibility of the transitional government was to hold post-conflict presidential elections within 10 months. .